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Trade Liberalization and Japanese
Agricultural Import Policies
Christos J. Pantzios and Timothy G. Taylor
This analysis empirically evaluates a subset of Japanese agricultural policies during
the 1970s and 1980s using the Trade Restrictiveness  Index recently developed  by
Anderson  and  Neary.  This  index,  though  theoretically  rigorous,  is  empirically
demanding, resulting in relatively few applications. Inferences  obtained from the
index are in general accordance with policy changes  and economic events over the
period of analysis. Using 1970 as the base, the estimated TRI suggests that policy
changes during 1970-87 resulted in moderately liberalized trade. Comparison with
a conventional measure of  trade distortion-producer and consumer subsidy equiva-
lents (PSEs and CSEs)-reveals contrasting inference.  This suggests the choice  of
empirical measures in evaluating trade policies is nontrivial.
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Introduction
The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, in conjunction with the
recent proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements, has in large part come
about because of the historically unparalled global agreement as to the desirability of
trade liberalization.  While the benefits of liberalized trade are generally acknowledged,
precisely how to measure the degree to which changes in complex policy regimes reflect
liberalized  trading environments  represents  an important and  difficult challenge  to
empirical economics. The difficulty in measuring the rate of trade liberalization derives
from the fact that trade-distorting  policies take many forms, including tariffs, quotas,
and certain domestic policies, as well as a plethora of nontariff barriers. Thus one must
aggregate across heterogeneous policy instruments.
Numerous  measures  r  for  determining  the  degree  to  which  trade  policy  regimes
are protective  have  been put forward.1 Notable  among these are the  average tariff
(Haberler),  nominal  and effective  rate  of protection  (Corden  1966,  1971),  domestic
resource cost (Bruno), and producer/consumer subsidy equivalents (United Nations/Food
and Agriculture Organization). While each of these measures captures changes in some
trade-distorting policies, a single unified measure that adequately accounts for a wide
range of policy instruments has remained elusive.
In a recent  series  of papers,  Anderson;  Anderson  and Neary  (1994);  and  Ander-
son, Bannister,  and Neary have proposed the Trade Restrictiveness  Index (TRI) as a
Pantzios is a visiting scholar, and Taylor is a professor, both in the Department of Food and Resource Economics, University
of Florida, Gainesville.
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theoretically rigorous measure  of the degree to which changes in trade policy regimes
reflect a liberalized trading environment. The TRI directly approaches the measurement
of trade policy changes as a problem of aggregation across heterogeneous policies using
the balance-of-trade function. This approach, which is somewhat analogous to the true-
cost-of-living index problem, provides appropriate weights for use in aggregating various
policy instruments (e.g., tariffs, quotas, etc.).
Though the TRI provides a rigorous theoretical measure for assessing the degree to
which policy changes  reflect trade  liberalization,  empirical  estimation of the TRI  is
computationally demanding. Indeed, relatively few empirical applications ofthe TRI can
be found in the literature (Anderson and Neary 1994; Anderson, Bannister, and Neary).
The purpose of this study is to mitigate this paucity of empirical literature on the TRI
in two  ways.  First, a TRI  index is estimated  for a subset  of Japanese  agricultural
products over the  1970-87 period,  and then evaluated  against historical trade policy
changes and other relevant economic events. While such analysis of the index is admit-
tedly qualitative, it does provide some insight into the degree to which this empirical
measure conforms with economic intuition surrounding historical trade policy changes.
Second, the estimated index is compared with a competing measure of trade distortion.
Such comparison is again admittedly qualitative. However, it does give some indication
of the degree to which the added computational burden associated with the TRI matters.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. First, we offer an overview of the
TRI and its theoretical foundation, followed by a description  of the methodology used
in empirically estimating the index for a set of Japanese agricultural products. The next
section presents the empirical results of the analysis and evaluates the resulting esti-
mates against known historical policy changes and economic events, as well as providing
a comparison with competing measures. Conclusions are presented in the final section.
The Trade Restrictiveness  Index
The  Trade  Restrictiveness  Index  is  perhaps  best  understood  via  comparison  with
compensating  variation measures  and price indexes. For an arbitrary  change in the
price vector (p) which moves the consumer from an initial utility (u°) to a final utility
(u1), the compensating variation is defined as the income adjustment, evaluated at post-
change prices, required to compensate the consumer (i.e., to make the consumer as well
off as in the initial situation). A scalar measure  of this compensation is provided by
the  true  cost-of-living  index  (Cornes).  Using  the  consumer's  budget  constraint  [as
manifested in the expenditure function e(p, u)], this index is defined as the uniform rate
by which all prices facing the consumer in the final situation must be adjusted so that
initial utility is preserved.
The TRI is based on a similar notion applied to a trading economy. Here, the analog
of consumers' expenditure is the budget constraint of a trading economy which equates
aggregate expenditure on all goods to total income (the latter being the sum of GNP and
government revenue, generated by the various distortions in place, and redistributed
to the aggregate  consumer). Based on this budget constraint, the TRI is defined as a
compensating variation measure of the trade distortions in place, relative to an initial
welfare level.  Specifically,  for an initial period  (0)  and a final  period (1),  the TRI is
defined as the uniform scaling factor by which all instruments of trade distortion (tariff
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rates, quota levels, etc.) in period 1 must be adjusted so that welfare level of period 0 is
attained.
The budget constraint of a trading economy can be specified by subsuming the con-
sumption and production sectors  into a single function, called the trade expenditure
function, which is defined as the difference between the aggregate expenditure function
and the total revenue (or GNP) function (Neary and Schweinberger).  As such, the trade
expenditure function retains all the standard properties of expenditure functions. Given
the importance of quantity restrictions in trade, the trade expenditure function also can
be defined only for the price-constrained goods, given the existing quantity restrictions
(e.g., quota levels). This gives rise to the distorted  trade  expenditure  function, expressed
in terms of prices, welfare, and quantity restrictions (Anderson and Neary 1992).
For a competitive trading economy imposing both price and quantity restrictions, its
budget constraint also can be expressed by setting the sum of total expenditure and total
income  equal to zero, thus introducing  a new function,  denoted the balance-of-trade
function. Formally, this function can be written as follows: 2
(1)  B(Q,  i, u; Y) = ED(Q,  n, u)  + p'Q - r'm(Q, 7, u)
- (1-  )(p-p*)'Q  = 0,
where ED(.) denotes the distorted trade expenditure function, Q denotes quota levels,
p is the price vector of quota-constrained goods,  m = ED(.) denotes import demand, n is
the domestic price vector of tariff-ridden goods, T is a vector of specific tariffs, y denotes
all  parameters  exogenous  to the  analysis,  and  p* denotes  exogenous  world  prices.
Additionally,  assuming incomplete retention of the quota rents at home, the scalar  o
denotes the portion of quota rents accruing to the economy's foreign suppliers.3
Trade-related distortions often coexist with domestic distortions (e.g., policies regu-
lating prices for the domestic producer,  consumers,  or both), distortions in nontraded
goods, or distortions occurring in factor markets rather than final goods markets. Such
distortions,  however,  can  be incorporated  into the present  framework.  Let vector  s
denote price distortions in nontraded goods, and z denote a vector of distortion param-
eters in factor markets. Through the respective expenditure and GNP functions, these
variables become  explicit arguments in the distorted balance-of-trade  function, which
is now written as B(n, Q, s, z, u) = 0.
For any two periods 0 and 1, the TRI is now defined as the uniform proportional factor
by which period-1 policy variables of trade and domestic distortions on traded  goods
must be adjusted so that the economy returns to period-0 welfare, u°. Denoting the TRI
by 6, its formal definition (Anderson and Neary 1994) is:
(2)  6(7G,Q,u°)  - 6:  B  16,  Q,s,z,u°;)  = 0  .
2 In principle,  one may write B(.) = b, with b denoting any net transfer from abroad including the balance-of-trade  deficit
(surplus).  However,  since  b  is largely determined  outside the present  framework  of analysis  (e.g.,  by central  monetary
authorities via exchange rate policies), it is assumed exogenous  and may be set equal to zero without loss of generality.
3To simplify the analysis, o is assumed invariant across commodities. To allow o to vary across commodities, the last term
on the right-hand side of (1)  can be written as (p - p*)'(I - Q)Q, where I is the identity matrix and Q is a diagonal matrix with
the different quota portions  ); on the diagonal.
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It may be noted that, as an index of trade restrictiveness, the TRI (6) is not applied
to distortion parameters  referring to nontraded  goods  and factors markets: it is the
uniform  scaling factor  applied to distortions  on traded goods  alone, however,  which
compensates the aggregate consumer for arbitrary changes in the markets of all (traded
and nontraded) goods. If trade policies  (nt,  Q) do not change between periods 0 and 1,
then 6 = 1. As the prices of tariff-ridden goods decline or quota levels increase, the rate
of change (d6/6) of the TRI (and subsequently its magnitude) rises. Thus, an increase in
the size of the TRI indicates the economy has liberalized its trade policy regime.
Implicitly assuming that 6 equals one in the initial period, the rate of change (d6/6)
may be obtained by totally differentiating  (2):
(d6  Ej (BQjQj)Qj  Ei (B  ci)i
(3)  d6  lii  +
6  BBQ  -B'it  BQQ -B'7
+1  (  k(Bs  Sk)  k  +  (Bz  d)iQ I  Ik
6BQ  BQ  - B  BQ - B'  )
where a dot (.) over a variable denotes a proportionate change (dQj/Qj, dnri/ri i, etc.). The
derivatives  BT and BQ are obtained by differentiating B(.) in (1) with respect to iT and
Q, keeping in mind that by definition of the distorted trade expenditure  function, its
first derivatives are E(.) = m, and EQ(.) = -p (Anderson and Neary 1992). Thus,
(4)  B  = -Tm  m,  + OQ'p,,  and
(5)  BQ  = -TmQ  +  oQ'Q  - (1  - )(p - p*)/.
The derivatives of the import demand functions, m(7, Q, u), and the inverse demand
functions,  p(nt,  Q,  u),  can be expressed  in terms  of either  the distorted ED(.) or the
standard trade expenditure function E(.) (Anderson and Neary 1992; Neary):
D  -1  D  1 (6)  mQ  = EQ =EpEp,  m,  =  ED  =  ET  - EpEppEp;
D  D  -1
(7)  PQ  =-EQQ  = Epp,  = -EQ  -E  p1Ep.
It should be noted that the derivatives -B, and -BQ estimate the effect of changes in
tariffs  and  quotas  on  the  economy's  welfare.  Thus  they  can be  interpreted  as  the
marginal cost of tariffs and the shadow price of quotas, respectively. Accordingly, the
term (BQQ - B'i)  equals the negative of the total cost of the initial trade structure (i.e.,
the welfare loss associated with the trade distortions),  and it is denoted the "shadow
value of distorted trade" (Anderson and Neary 1994).
As seen in (3), the TRI equals the weighted sum of: (a) the proportional changes in all
trade and domestic distortions  t and Q (with each component Ti and Qj being weighted
by its contribution  to the total welfare  loss  of the initial trade regime),  and  (b)  the
proportional changes  in nontraded  goods prices s, or factor market distortion param-
eters z, each being weighted by the respective induced change in the balance-of-trade
function and normalized by the total welfare loss.
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An Empirical Application
to Japanese Agricultural Products
Although Japan is one of the world's largest net importers of foodstuffs, its agricultural
sector is characterized by a complex web of domestic support programs and trade inter-
vention.  In addition to conventional  trade policies  such as import tariffs and quotas,
trade is also affected directly through state agencies or controlled indirectly via quasi-
governmental  agencies [e.g., the Livestock Industry Promotion  Corporation (LIPC)].
This study focuses on Japanese agricultural programs4 comprising an important set
of trade and domestic restrictions (e.g., quotas on beef and citrus, and the ban on rice
imports) that have been criticized  throughout the 1980s by Japan's trading partners.
Specifically,  a  TRI  is  estimated  and  used  to  assess  the  combined  restrictiveness
associated with domestic support and trade policies implemented  on (a) beef, (b) pork,
(c) poultry, (d) wheat, (e) rice, and (f)  fresh oranges over the 1970-87 period.
Trade policies  affecting these commodities  (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and
Resource  Economics; Fitchett;  Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and Develop-
ment) are summarized below.
*  Beef. Government intervention consisted of imposing annually a "price stabilization
band" on beef prices and administering the beef sector via the state-controlled LIPC.
The  LIPC maintained  domestic  beef prices within  this predetermined  "band" by
controlling both  domestically  produced  and imported  quantities  released  in the
market. In practice, the LIPC manipulated the beef market by regulating the flow of
imports via quotas, which were set semiannually.  On top of the quota, beef imports
were subject to a 25% ad valorem tariff.
*  Pork and Poultry. Support programs consisted of "price stabilization bands" adminis-
tered by the  LIPC.  Domestic  pork  prices were  maintained  within  the respective
"band" by means of a variable levy (instead of a quota). Pork imports were subject to
the higher of either  a 5%  ad valorem tariff or a differential  duty.  The latter was
applied whenever the import price was lower than the central price  of the stabili-
zation band, and was defined as the difference between the central price of the "band"
and the import price. Domestic poultry prices were maintained by the LIPC at desired
levels by imposing a 20% ad valorem tariff on all poultry imports.
*  Rice.  The  rice industry was administered  by Japan's governmental  Food Agency,
which annually determined producer and wholesale (user) prices. Throughout the
1970s and 1980s, rice imports were virtually banned (reflecting Japan's decision to
maintain full self-sufficiency in rice); exports occurred only on an exceptional basis-
as a means of disposing of rice surplus.  High support prices,  however, resulted in
considerable domestic surpluses. Thus, during 1970-87, the Japanese administration
introduced four land diversion programs to divert riceland toward priority crops (e.g.,
wheat).  In all four programs,  an acreage  reduction  target was  set annually,  and
diversion payments were offered to participant farmers.
4  In terms of import value, the commodities examined here represent 20-30% of the total value of Japanese imports in food
and live animals during 1970-87. Insufficient information or lack of data did not allow consideration of a more comprehensive
set of agricultural programs.
342  December 1998Trade Liberalization  and  Japanese  Import Policies  343
*  Wheat. In contrast to rice, more than 80% of wheat in Japan was imported during the
period of analysis.  Nonetheless,  the Food Agency set both producer and wholesale
prices (as with rice),  and directly administered all wheat imports. For domestically
produced wheat, the differences between producer and wholesale prices were substan-
tial, resulting in considerable government losses.
* Fresh Oranges. Imports of fresh oranges during 1970-87 were subject to quotas; addi-
tionally, a 20-40% tariff rate was imposed, depending on the time of importation (on-
season, off-season imports).
The  above  trade  policies  include  tariff-ridden  goods  (pork  and  poultry),  quota-
constrained goods (beef and fresh oranges), and state-controlled goods (rice and wheat),
one of which  (rice) is a nontraded good5 in the Japanese  market. The  corresponding
partial equilibrium budget constraints requires that the value of aggregate  consumer
expenditure  on these  goods  equal the  sum  of generated  GNP  plus government  net
revenues  and transfers.  These revenues  and transfers  include tariff revenues,  quota
rents,7 net (producer/user) subsidies for the state-controlled goods, and riceland diver-
sion payments. This equilibrium is summarized via the following distorted balance-of-
trade function: 8
(8)  B(h, s, p, Q, A, u)  ED(h, s, p, Q, A, u)
+ p'Q- (  - p*)'Q - r'm(h, s, p, Q, u)
+ (p - a*)'Y(p)  - (s  - o*)'X(h,  s,  Q, u)  - cA  = 0,
where vector h  denotes prices of the tariff-ridden goods, Q represents quota levels, p
denotes producer prices for the state-controlled goods, s indicates wholesale (user) prices
for the state-controlled goods, and a and p denote the international prices of the state-
controlled and the quota-constrained goods, respectively. Y(.) and X(*) denote the quanti-
ties supplied and demanded, respectively,  of the state-controlled goods, A represents
diverted  acreage  of riceland,  and c is the per acre diversion payments made  to rice
growers.
6Goods may not be traded for a number of reasons. Typically, nontraded goods include factors of production or final goods
with high transportation costs or perishability. Although tradable in principle, rice in our study was steadily excluded from
trade due to political considerations. As the TRI is defined only with respect to goods traded in finite, positive quantities and
prices, the ban on rice imports (interpreted as a quota set steadily at zero) does not affect the rate of change of the index.
Treating rice  as a nontraded good in our analysis allows its domestic  regulations to be taken implicitly into account in the
computation  of the TRI.
6Although the TRI is, in principle, a general equilibrium concept, its applications mostly have been in a partial equilibrium
framework (Anderson and Neary  1994; Anderson, Bannister, and Neary). A major reason is that "in practice, its focus  on
trade  policy instruments  suggests choosing  a highly disaggregated  model  to capture the fine detail  of actual  protective
policies. This in turn suggests implementing the TRI in either a partial equilibrium model or a general equilibrium model
with tightly specified  structure" (Anderson and Neary 1994, p.  160). In the present study, the adopted partial equilibrium
framework implies that any cross-effects  from the examined protective  policies on the rest of the economy (e.g.,  on factor
markets, on nonagricultural production/consumption,  etc.) are subsumed in the background.
7 Full retention of quota rents is assumed for both beef and oranges, as imported beef reaches the domestic market via the
quasi-governmental  LIPC  while the contribution of distortions of orange imports to the index is small.
8The distorted trade expenditure function ED(.) is generally specified as [eD(h, s, p, Q, u) - (g(h, s, p) +  w'V)], with functions
eD(.) and g()  representing the aggregate consumer expenditure and profits on the tariff and state-controlled goods, and w'V
representing value of payments w to primary factors V, such as land, capital, etc.
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Subsuming all domestic and trade-related  distortions on prices into the same vector
(71),  the TRI associated with the set of the examined agricultural policies is defined as:
(9)  6=-  [6:  B-(6n1,  - Price  SriceA,  AU)  =
and its proportionate  change, d6/6, is given by total differentiation of the preceding
expression:
(10)  d6  Ej (BQQj)Qj  (BSii)i
6  BQ -B,;T  B'Q -B'
1  srice Srice  Brice  riceA  -0
6  BBQ  - B  ri  ce B  Q -B  7Pri ce + B  Q - B'7
where the subscript i indexes pork, poultry, and wheat, and the subscriptj indexes beef
and fresh oranges.
Empirical Results and Analysis
Estimation  of the index  requires evaluation  of the policy  derivatives  in (10)  which
involve price derivatives of demand and supply for the examined goods.9 This study uses
yearly estimates of own- and cross-price response  of demand, obtained via the system-
wide (or differential) approach (Theil 1967, 1980).10Due to lack of data, however, we rely
on  exogenous  information  about the price  response  of supply  reported  in the U.S.
Department  of Agriculture's Trade Liberalization Database (TLIB) (USDA 1989).
The empirical estimates for the TRI, as well as its component terms for the 1970-87
period,  are presented in table  1. The rate of change (d6/6)  of the TRI, which measures
changes in the degree of trade liberalization in year t relative to the prior year, is shown
in the last  column  as the  sum  of (weighted) proportional  changes  of its individual
components. For each of  the examined commodities, this component is the rate of change
(with respect to the previous period, t - 1) of the policy instrument applied on the com-
modity (be it  domestic  price, quota level,  or diversion acreage)  times a welfare  loss-
related weight as shown in (10).
Summing across the examined commodities,  the rate of change of the TRI increases
with lower prices (in) for tariff-ridden and state-traded goods, higher quotas (Q), and less
land  employed  in  rice  production  (which  render  the  respective  component  terms
positive). Hence, the rate of change of the index rises as the trade distortions (t,  Q) and
9 The specification  of the policy derivatives in (10)  are available  from the authors upon request.
10  The Rotterdam model was used, and the examined goods were divided into two separable groups-the first including
meat and grains (i.e., beef, pork, poultry, wheat, and rice), and the second including fresh oranges  along with all citrus fruit
(Pantzios).  Oranges  were  separated  because  preliminary  estimations including  all six goods  in  a  single  group  showed
insignificant cross-price  relations between  oranges and the rest of the goods.
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the misallocation of resources  (riceland) are reduced. Inspection of this rate of change
in table 1 reveals that the value of the TRI is shaped primarily by changes in the rice-
land diversion program, the beef quota, and, to a lesser extent, pork and poultry prices.
In contrast, the contributions of rice and wheat are minimal, reflecting the persistent
policies of regulating the producer and consumer prices in both crops  throughout the
period examined.
As  seen from  table  1, the index exhibits  considerable  variation  over the  1971-77
period, and a relatively smooth pattern over the 1978-87  period.  In particular,  during
1971-73,  the  index  shows  a  positive  but  rapidly  decreasing  rate  of change-thus
implying that the trade restrictiveness  of the examined  policies is falling,  albeit at a
decreasing rate. This is the combined result of (a) an increase in the beef quota, orange
quota, and riceland diversion (all of which raise liberalization)  at a diminishing rate,
and (b) a simultaneous rise in the domestic prices of pork and poultry (which contribute
to more restrictiveness).  In 1974, the rate of change of the TRI turns negative, implying
a severe  reduction in the magnitude of the TRI  and therefore a dramatic increase in
trade protection for that period. This severe drop of the index reflects the decision of the
Japanese government to suspend the beef quota in late 1973, and to completely close the
beef market to imports  in  1974 until the second half of 1975 (Australian  Bureau of
Agricultural and Resource Economics). This was coupled with an increase of almost 12%
in the wholesale pork price, a  13.5% increase in the wholesale price of poultry, and a
79.5% reduction in the amount of riceland diverted from rice production.
During the  1975-78 period, the index shows a slight increase  as its rate of change
becomes less negative in 1975 and turns positive in 1976, almost zero in 1977 (reflecting
stable  policies  during  1976-77),  and  again  positive  in  1978  (reflecting  higher  beef
imports, higher riceland diversion, and lower pork and poultry prices). Thereafter, the
index shows  less variation.  Specifically,  for the period 1978-84, the index exhibits  a
positive but decreasing rate of change  as the beef quota was slightly reduced in 1980,
1981, and  1982, while pork and poultry prices  rose and the diversion rate of riceland
became smaller and even negative in 1983-84.
After  1984, the index's rate of change  shows  a steady increase,  indicating  a trade
liberalization  process at least for the period 1984-87.  This is consistent with the so-
called "1984 U.S.-Japan Beef and Citrus Understanding"-i.e.,  in August  1984, Japan
agreed to expand its import quotas for fresh oranges and grain-fed beef mainly supplied
by the U.S. (USDA 1984).  This TRI  steady increase also reflects  decreasing domestic
prices on pork and poultry, stable or even decreasing domestic prices in wheat and rice,
and very small variation in the riceland diversion programs.
Table  2  presents  the level of the TRI,  computed  as  a simple  difference  equation
(Anderson, Bannister, and Neary). In particular, the index is computed for each one of
the periods  1971 through 1987 relative to the initial period  1970, which is normalized
so  that  61970  =  1.  After  dramatic  increases  and  drops  in the  early  and  mid-1970s,
respectively, the value of the index is consistently higher than one from the late 1970s
and throughout the 1980s, indicating a slight liberalization trend. It  is interesting to
note that the value of the TRI in 1987 is 58% higher than in 1970. However, the value
of the TRI in 1972 is twice as high as in the first period. Therefore,  one must also note
that the lower distortions in the end of the examined period are still more restrictive
when compared to those in the beginning of the 1970s.
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Table 2.  The Level of the TRI of Japanese Agricultural Policies Relative to
1970, for the 1970-87 Period (1970 =1)
Year  TRI Level  Year  TRI Level  Year  TRI Level
1970  1.00  1976  1.10  1982  1.67
1971  1.96  1977  0.99  1983  1.65
1972  2.08  1978  1.22  1984  1.49
1973  1.86  1979  1.38  1985  1.53
1974  0.93  1980  1.45  1986  1.64
1975  0.73  1981  1.34  1987  1.58
Anderson, Bannister, and Neary suggest decompositions of the TRI which allow some
comparison  with  the more  conventional  measures  of producer  subsidy  equivalents
(PSEs) and consumer subsidy equivalents (CSEs). Along these lines, we have considered
in our application two separate distortion indexes: a production-distortion index (6P) and
a consumption-distortion index (6C). Both indexes are defined and computed analogously
to the full TRI.  However,  6P considers  only production-related  distortions  which are
welfare-equivalent to policy changes from period 0 to period 1, and ignores policy vari-
ables related to consumption. Index 6c is defined similarly for the consumption side.
Indexes 6' and 6C, computed for the period 1982-87, are compared with the aggregate
PSE and CSE 11of the examined goods in table 3. Starting with 61982 = 1, we compute the
level of 6P for each of the 1983-87  periods, relative to the 1982 base period. Findings
show that the production-distortion index 6P implies steadily diminishing production-
related distortions during the 1982-87 period, as its value is higher than one throughout
1983-87.  In contrast, the aggregate PSE in each of the 1983-87 periods implies higher
production-related distortions when compared to the aggregate PSE of the 1982 period.
Identical  findings  hold in  comparing  the consumption-distortion  index  6c with  the
aggregate CSE.
These contradictory conclusions  are explained by the fundamentally different ways
in which 6P, 6c, PSEs, and CSEs are constructed.  The use of value shares as weights
results in aggregate  PSEs  (CSEs)  shaped primarily  by goods  with high  production
(consumption) value. Additionally, PSEs (CSEs) consider the variation in price in the
cases  of both tariff-ridden  and quota-controlled  goods; this conceals the fact that for
quota-controlled goods, the distortion is founded in the available quantity, and therefore
the variation  in quantity  is more relevant in evaluating distortions.  The  distortion
indexes (6P and 6C), on the other hand, consider explicitly either price or quantity vari-
ations  of the  examined  goods,  while  their  individual  components  are  aggregated
according to their contribution to the total welfare loss associated with the distortions
in place.  Methodologically,  therefore,  the explicit theoretical foundation  of distortion
indexes such as 6,  6P, or 6 c makes the TRI approach more appealing in assessing trade
liberalization over such ad hoc aggregate indicators as PSEs (CSEs).
n The Japanese PSEs and CSEs for each of the examined goods during the period 1982-87 were obtained from the USDA
(1988,  1990). Aggregates were obtained as weighted averages, using as weights the respective production (consumption) value
shares.
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Table  3.  Comparison  of the  TRI  with Producer and Consumer  Subsidy
Equivalents,  1982-87
Aggregate PSE  Level of Index  Aggregate CSE  Level of Index
Year  (yield/MT)  (6P  for 6982 = 1)  (yield/MT)  (6C for 6982  1)
1982  310,951  1.00  -263,950  1.00
1983  342,365  1.02  -305,985  1.07
1984  336,236  1.06  -305,721  1.10
1985  328,767  1.13  -305,535  1.18
1986  391,267  1.26  -387,632  1.29
1987  396,640  1.41  -403,549  1.41
Conclusions
The TRI is an attractive measure  for assessing the degree  to which changes in policy
regimes reflect, or fail to reflect, liberalized trade. Regarding the theoretical robustness
of available protection  indicators and their ability to cover diverse  sets of distorting
policies, the  TRI has some potential advantages.  These include  a robust theoretical
derivation, consistent and meaningful aggregation across commodities, and the explicit
inclusion of nonprice distortions,  thereby allowing modeling of a wide array of trade
policies. Additionally, to the extent that interrelationships  exist among the examined
goods, cross-effects  from changes in the examined policies are explicitly accounted for
in computing the index's welfare weights [as may be seen in (4) and (5)].
However, since empirical implementation of the index can be difficult, the TRI lacks
one of the most attractive characteristics of index numbers-ease of implementation. Its
simplicity as a scalar measure of trade distortions also may be seen  as a limitation.
Subsuming complicated policy distortions in a simple index measure can create a "black
box" problem; as these distortions are treated in a summary fashion, underlying specific
policies and intermediate effects may be obscured.
The goals of this study were to evaluate the performance of an estimated TRI for a
subset of Japanese  agricultural  products  against known  policy  changes  and  other
economic events over the 1970-87 period, and to compare the inferences obtained from
the TRI with a competing measure, the PSE/CSE. The estimated TRI suggested that the
degree  of liberalization  (or  protectionism)  implied  by  Japanese  trade  policies  was
determined primarily by changes in the riceland diversion program and in the quota on
beef. Policies affecting pork and poultry prices were also significant. The behavior of the
index over the 1970-87 period provides some interesting insight into the degree of liber-
alization implied by policies affecting the subsector analyzed.  Using 1970 as the base
period, the TRI suggests that, in 1987, policy changes over the period have resulted in
moderately liberalized trade. Additionally, the policy changes consistently represented
liberalized trade since 1977. The index also suggests that the observed changes in the
beef and citrus quotas in the early 1970s resulted in significant trade liberalization.
A comparison of the TRI approach with an aggregated PSE/CSE calculated over the
1983-87 period provided substantially different inferences about the effects of changes
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in trade policies affecting the subsector analyzed.  Admittedly, the two measures may
not be directly comparable;  they differ in their definitions, and the policies they cover
may not be precisely the same. However,  these differences may well be related to the
choice  of weights in estimating the two measures.  Regardless of where the differences
lay, the present analysis suggests that the measure used to assess the degree of trade
liberalization (or protectionism) can substantially impact the inferences  obtained.
It is always a bit risky to use economic intuition as a measuring stick. However, based
on the performance of the TRI over the period of analysis, it appears that the estimated
TRI  provides  measures  in general  accordance  with what  would  be  expected  given
observed policy changes  and economic  events  over the 1970-87 period.  Additionally,
based  on the comparison between the TRI and PSE/CSE, it  appears that the choice
of index  used  to assess  the degree  of trade  liberalization  can,  in fact, matter-and
matter  a lot.  While these  findings  must be considered  in the context  of the modest
analysis attempted  here, it is hoped that the implications of this study will spur addi-
tional research on the performance  of the TRI in order to provide more generalizable
conclusions.
[Received August 1997; final revision received April 1998.]
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